Limitations and Development of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine by Harman, Edward
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 4 
January 1933 
Limitations and Development of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine 
Edward Harman 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Harman, Limitations and Development of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 
333 (1933). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
not be filed, he cannot be adjudicated without his consent. After
adjudication, the normal course of bankruptcy administration is
followed. 68
It is finally necessary to consider the constitutionality of the
new statute. It is settled that the power of Congress over the
subject of bankruptcy is not limited to the classes which might
become bankrupt under the law as it stood at the time the Con-
stitution was framed. 64 A person may be allowed to file as a
voluntary bankrupt even though he is not insolvent as the term is
used in the Act of 1898.65 Indeed, the great popular clamor
against the Act of 1867 was that it allowed any person who could
not pay his debts in full as they matured to be forced into bank-
ruptcy. 8 The plan for extensions is closely analogous in basic
principle to the composition agreements sanctioned by the Act of
1898.67 It is true that secured debtors are now affected by the
extension but it would seem that if Congress can force a dissent-
ing minority of unsecured creditors to be bound by a composition
agreement that it has power to do the same as to secure creditors.
Under the Act of 1898 the liens of such secured creditors may be
set aside in many instances. 68
It would seem to present writer that the new amendment is
capable of providing considerable relief to the hard-pressed indi-
vidual debtor. Perhaps it is the confused drafting of the statute
which has prevented more frequent resort to its provisions. Cer-
tainly a series of clarifying amendments are desirable.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
LIMITATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTRAC-
TIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Even since 1841, when Lord Denham, Chief Justice of the
Queen's Bench, laid down the controlling principles of what subse-
quently has been known as the "attractive nuisance doctrine",
there have been divergent interpretations, limitations, and exten-
sions of this rule. Lynch v. Nurdin1 has itself been regarded by
some courts as overruled or, at least, seriously impaired by later
68 Sec. 74 (m).
64 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U. S. 181.
65 Note 7 above.
66 Remington on Bankruptcy (2nd ed.) p. 14.
67 Matter of Reiman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 11,673; In Re
Reiman (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 11,675.
68 Sec. 67.
1 (1841) 1 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041.
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English decisions.2 An earlier English case sometimes cited as
authority for the doctrine, Townsend v. Wathen,3 is not strictly in
point, and may be distinguished from the "turntable cases", in
which no element of wilful injury is involved. 4
The leading American case of Sioux City & Pacific R. R. Co. v.
Stout5 first applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to railroad
turntables. This case has been criticized and questioned by many
courts who have not felt free openly to repudiate the principles
therein enunciated.0 The next important case on the subject to
come before the Supreme Court of the United States, Union Pa-
cific R. Co. v. McDonald,7 likewise has been open to various at-
tacks.8 In fact, examination of annotations of this subject read-
ily discloses that from the very first there have been many courts
which have refused to admit that there is any logical basis for the
rule and have preferred the concept of inviolability of private
property from trespass and onerous burdens.9
Any discussion of the conditions of liability in any particular
case must be interpreted in the light of a clear understanding of
the basis upon which liability should rest in this class of cases.
Thus, if liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine is put on
the basis of intentional or wilful injury,'0 or wantonness,11 all at-
tempts to measure and delimit the liability by reference to the age
or capacity of the child or to the effect of warning must prove
2 Hughes v. Macfie (1863) 2 Hurlst. & C. 744, 159 Eng. Rep. 308; Manjan
v. Atterton (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 239.
3 (1808) 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579.
4 In Townsend v. Wathen poisoned baits were set in traps near the plain-
tiff's land, so that the plaintiff's dogs might scent the bait and be drawn into a
trespass and subsequent injury. A landowner has always been responsible
for wilful torts to trespassers. See Walker v. Potomac, F. & P. R. Co. (1906)
:105 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113, and Wheeling & L. E. R. Co. v. Harvey (1907) 77
Ohio St. 235, 83 N. E. 16 for distinctions.
6 (1874) 17 Wall. 657.
6 Daniels v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. (1891) 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. E. 283; Bot-
turn v. Hawks (1911) 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858; Walsb v. Fitchburg R. Co.
(1895) 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068; Dobbins v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (1897) 91
Tex. 63,41 S. W. 63.
7 (1894) 152 U. S. 262.
8 McCabe v. American Woolen Co. (1903) 124 Fed. 283; Bottum v. Hawks,
note 6, above.
9 Exhaustive annotations may be found in (1909) 19 L. R. A. (NS) 1095;
(1911) 32 L. R. A. (NS) 559; (1914) 47 L. R. A. (NS) 1101; (1925) 36
A. L. R. 34; (1925) 39 A. L. R. 486; (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1344; (1929) 60
A. L. R. 1444.
10 Townsend v. Wathen, above, criticized by Judge Jeremiah Smith, "Lia-
bility of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission," 11 Harv.
L. Rev. 349.
11 City of Shawnee v. Cheek (1913) 41 Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724; Altus v.
Milliken (1924) 98 Okla. 1, 233 P. 851.
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futile. Likewise, if the theory of a trap or concealed danger is
used to sustain liability, there is the additional issue of whether or
not the nuisance was concealed to the particular party injured. 12
The trap theory probably owes its origin either to Townsend v.
Wathen, or to the confusion of the attractive nuisance cases with
those dealing with the degree of care required toward licensees,
i. e. freedom from traps. 13 Undoubtedly, the frequently reiterated
limitation of the doctrine to latent dangers has grown out of the
same misconception. 14
Considering the consequences of adopting any particular basis
of liability, it will be seen, further, that any court proceeding upon
the misguided assumption that the maxim, "sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas", offers a sufficient judicial explanation of the
attractive nuisance doctrine must later find itself seeking to draw
the reins on wild horses; for the doctrine then "goes to the limit of
the law", 15 and should logically apply to all alike, with no distinc-
tion in favor of children. 16
It might be observed also that acceptance by the majority of the
courts of the implied invitation theory of the basis of the doctrine
has resulted in such extended criticism that either the doctrine it-
self has been expressly rejected in such jurisdictions, or the courts
have taken occasion to carry the theory to its logical conclusion,
and have so restricted the application of the doctrine as to render
it almost ineffectual. Assaults upon the implied invitation theory
have been made from two angles: first, the in terrorem argument
based on the dangers of imposing so harsh a liability on property
owners; second, the practical and common sense insistence that
such implication of invitation is usually at variance with the own-
er's actual intent. The courts of Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Vermont
have, at various times, pointed out the fallacies of this theory.1 7
Perhaps the best theoretical basis for liability here is the gen-
eral principle that "one who has reason to anticipate injury to an-
other from conditions for which he is responsible, and which he
can readily avert, is under a duty, based upon considerations of
humanity to take reasonable precautions against such injury."18
12 Cooke v. Midland Great Western R. Co. (1909) A. C. 229.
1 Consolidated Lead & Zinc Co. v. Corcoran (C. C. A. 1930) 37 Fed. (2d)
296; Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup (1929) 88 Ind. App. 572, 165
N. E. 246.
14 Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton (Ariz. 1932) 8 Pac.(2d) 249; Union Pac. R. Co. v. McDonald (1894) 152 U. S. 262.15 Bishop v. Union R. Co. (1884) 14 R. I. 314, 51 Am. Rep. 386; M., K. & T.
R. Co. v. Edwards (1896) 90 Tex. 65, 36 S. W. 430.is Bottum v. Hawks, note 6, above; Ratte v. Dawson (1892) 50 Minn. 450,
52 N. W. 965.
IT Refer to (1925) 36 A. L. R. 116 for collection of the cases.Is Refer to (1925) 36 A. L. R. 119.
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By so resting the reason for the rule one can, with some degree of
certainty, predict the result in any given set-up of facts, which isjust what the property owner wishes to know when he is consider-
ing what precautions he should take in safeguarding his property.
A few cases illustrative of this method of laying the foundation
of liability should be helpful. In Christiansen v. Los Angeles & St.
L. R. Co.,19 the plaintiff was injured after rescuing his son from a
runaway freight car. The court held that an ordinary freight
car was not an attractive nuisance, but that since the defendant
knew or should have known of the frequent resort of children to
the yards as a playground, it was under a duty to use reasonable
care to keep its freight cars from running away. In Morse v.
Douglas20 the facts were that a two-wheeled vehicle, supporting a
vat of hot tar, had been left in the street with its tongue supported
on a pile of sand. A seven-year old child stepped upon the back
platform of the vehicle to stir the tar; his weight overturned the
vehicle, and he was burned to death. Recovery was allowed un-
der the attractive nuisance doctrine, but the rationalization of the
defendant's liability on the ground of what he should have antici-
pated brought it within the ordinary rules of negligence. Adams
v. Virginian Gasolene & Oil Co. 2  is significant in that although
the attractive nuisance doctrine has been expressly repudiated in
Virginia,22 it was there held that where a six year old trespasser
was actually known to be present and in danger of asphyxiation
from freed gasolene fumes, reasonable care must be used by the
owner to avoid injury. Other cases seem to have arived at just
results through similar application of the broad prificiple of an-
ticipated injury.23
In reality, almost all developments of the attractive nuisance
doctrine might be grouped under two heads: first, the affixing or
removal of conditions upon liability; and, second, the extension or
limitation of the doctrine in its application to a particular attrac-
tion or cause of injury.
It is an elementary proposition, at the outset, that the rule does
not make of the property owner an insurer of the safety of chil-
dren, but only renders him liable for want of reasonable precau-
tions to prevent an injury. In fact, the doctrine itself has been
negatively stated as rendering inapplicable those rules limiting
a liability to trespassers. The child is placed in the class of in-
vitees, but all the rules of general tort liability thereafter apply.24
19 (1930) 77 Utah 85, 291 Pac. 926.
20 (1930) 107 Cal. App. 196, 290 Pac. 465.
21 (1930) 109 W. Va. 631,156 S. E. 63.
22 artino v. Rotondi (1922) 91 W. Va. 482, 113 S. E. 760.
2 3 Hall's Adm'x v. City of Greenburg (1931) 241 Ky. 279, 43 S. W. (2d)
660; Collinger v. Philadelphia Electric Co. (1930) 301 Pa. 87, 151 Atl. 599.24 Hall's Adm'x v. City of Greenburg, above, note 23; Jefferson v. Birming-
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It has been held, however, that the degree of care necessary must
be commensurate with the danger,25 and is greater or more exact-
ing with young children, being proportioned to their lack of
judgment.2 6
But there is no duty to go to a greater expense in providing safe-
guards or to assume precautions which might prove so burden-
some as to be impractical. 27 Nor need the owner make the tres-
pass impossible or his property "child proof."28  Thus, where the
defendant maintained an electric substation, nine feet high,
thirty-one feet long, and ten feet wide, constructed wholly of
smooth sheet-iron but open at the top and containing electric
transformers, no liability attached where a child obtained a ladder
and climbed into the enclosure with a resulting injury.29
Just how much of a guard is necessary, it is difficult to deter-
mine. In the case of Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kilpatrik,30
a seven year old boy climbed over, through, or under a ten foot
fence of mesh and barbed wire in order to reach a certain "attrac-
tion" near the defendant's substation. The defendant was held
liable. In McDonald v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co.,31 it ap-
peared from the opinion that a seven year old boy had climbed
over a five foot mesh fence, surmounted with two feet and three
inches of barbed wire into an enclosure containing a power sub-
station and tower. The court held that the child "was allured by
the strikingly odd and attractive looking tower", and that such a
fence as described was no obstacle to a boy acting under a stimulus
of such an allurement. A case, almost to the opposite extreme as
to adequacy of guard, Le Duc v. Detroit Edison Co.,32 held that one
ham R. Co. (1897) 116 Ala. 294, 22 So. 546; Sexton v. Noll Construction Co.
(1918) 108 S. C. 516, 95 S. E. 129; Kemp v. Doe Run Lead Co. (Mo. App.
1933) 57 S. W. (2d) 758; McDermott v. Burke (1912) 256 Ill. 401, 100 N. E.
168.
26 Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Dunsford (1920) 189 Ky. 785, 225
S. W. 741; Matteson v. Minn. & N. W. R. Co. (1905) 96 Minn. 477, 104 N. W.
443.
26 Barrett v. So. Pac. Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 296, 27 Pac. 666; Penso v. McCor-
mick (1890) 125 Ind. 116, 25 N. E. 156.
27 Peters v. Bowman (1896) 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 113; Chicago & E. R. Co.
v. Fox (1904) 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81; Brown v. Salt Lake City (1908)
33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570; Wilson v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co. (1903) 66 Kans. 183,
71 Pac. 282; Overholt v. Vieths (1887) 93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74.
28s McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills (1917) 109 S. C. 238, 95 S. E. 781;
Taylor v. Minneapolis & St. P. R. Co. (1917) 180 Ia. 702, 163 N. W. 405;
Grube v. Baltimore (1918) 132 Ind. 355, 103 AtI. 948; Holstine v. Director
Gen. of R. R. (1922) 77 Ind. App. 583, 134 N. E. 303.
29 Coilinger v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (1930) 301 Pa. 87, 151 Atl. 699.
- (1932) 185 Ark. 678, 49 S. W. (2d) 353.
31 (La. App. 1931) 136 So. 169.
32 (1931) 254 Mich. 86, 235 N. W. 832.
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who left a gasolene tank where it was easily accessible to children
was not liable for injuries resulting from burning gasolene with-
drawn from the tank, because he had provided the tank with a
faucet which could be turned with an ordinary water faucet key.
Some cases have reasoned the sole basis for imposing liability is
the slight expense of providing adequate protection, and have re-
stricted liability where the cost of adequate safeguard would be so
great as to seem impractical. Bonhomie & H. S. Ry. Co. v. Hin.
ton 33 grew out of an injury sustained by a six year old boy when a
door on which he was sliding back and forth fell off its hinges.
The court held that everything attractive and dangerous cannot be
held within the doctrine, or litigation would become oppressive
and vexatious, and would impose such burdens of care as would
impair materially the value of property and cripple business seri-
ously. A similar point of view prevailed in Stadtherr v. CitV of
Sauk Center.3 4  The turntable doctrine was there said to rest up-
on the ease and slight expense of guarding the turntable, and lia-
bility was denied partly on the ground that such ease of safe-
guarding was not therein present.
It has been suggested repeatedly by some courts that the doc-
trine of attractive nuisance should be confined to attractive and
dangerous machinery, 35 or to turntable cases. 8 Conversely it
will not apply to natural conditions, 7 or to common objects,3 8 or
to attractions arising from the regular conduct of business.39 In
Texas it has been intimated that the attractive object must be un-
usually attractive,40 while other jurisdictions would confine the
classes of objects which come under the rule to those uncommon
and artificially produced.41
33 (1929) 155 Miss. 173, 124 So. 271.
34 (1930) 180 Minn. 492, 231 N. W. 210.
85 Stendal v. Boyd (1897) 73 Minn. 53, 73 N. W. 735.
31 State ex. rel. K. C. L. & P. Co. v. Trimble (1926) 315 Mo. 32, 285 S. W.
455; Howard v. St. Joseph Trans. Co. (1926) 316 Mo. 317, 289 S. W. 455;
Harakas v. Diekie (1929) 224 Mo. App. 171, 23 S. W. (2d) 651.
37 Harper v. Topeka (1914) 92 Kan. 11, 132 Pac. 1018; Peters v. Bowman
(1895) 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 113; Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n V.
Compton, above, note 14.3
'Heva v. Seattle School Dist. (1920) 11 Wash. 668, 188 Pac. 776; Emond
v. Kemberley-Clark Co. (1914) 158 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760; Stadtherr v. City
of Sauk Center (1930) 180 Minn. 492, 231 N. W. 210; Bonhomie & H. S. R.
Co. v. Hinton, note 33, above.39 Nixon v. Montana W. & S. Co. (1914) 50 Mont. 95, 145 Pac. 8; Zartner v.
George (1914) 156 Wis. 131, 145 N. W. 971.
40 San Antonio & A. R. Co. v. Morgan (1898) 92 Tex. 98, 46 S. W. 28.41 Brown v. Salt Lake City (1908) 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570; Peters v. Bow-
man (1896) 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 113; Nichol v. Bell Tel. Co. (1920) 266 Pa.
463, 109 Atl. 649; McComb City v. Hayman (1921) 124 Miss. 525, 87 So. 11.
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A discussion of some of the recent cases illustrating the view
that the principle does not apply to natural conditions should
prove profitable. In Salt River Valley Water Users' Assn. v.
Compton42 a thirteen year old boy climbed a pole supporting a
high voltage electric power line in order to reach a bird's nest at
the top and was severely burned when he came in contact with the
wires. The court held that natural objects such as birds' nests do
not come within the doctrine of attractive nuisance. 43 The better
restatement of this rule on rehearing, that the doctrine does not
apply to natural objects not placed on the defendant's property by
the defendant, would reconcile the famous Florida Magnolia Blos-
som Case."4 There the natural object, a magnolia tree in blossom,
was by the defendant's own act of stringing its wires through the
tree, rendered the medium by which children might be brought
into contact with the dangerous instrumentality. For many
years, by the overwhelming weight of authority, ponds have not
been considered technical attractive nuisances because they were
natural conditions and, with nothing more, were not dangerous
per se.45 This rule has been extended to artificial lakes and ponds
also.46 The rule and its exception have recently been stated in
Raeside v. Sioux City.47 "Ponds are not attractive nuisances
per se, and in the absence of anything indicating something done
by the landowner calculated to render the pond attractive to chil-
dren, something more than water in its natural state, the doctrine
of the turntable cases does not apply." Rafts, logs, boats, and
planks floating in the pond have generally been conceded to con-
vert the body of water into a dangerous instrumentality. 48 This
leads to strange results. As was said in Kelly v. First Bank and
Trust Co.,49 "A child may see other children catching fish from a
pond and may see fish in the pond, and if they undertake to fish
and meet with accident there can be no recovery. But if the child
sees floating logs in a pond on which other children are playing,
a cause of action will arise if such child engages in the sport and
loses its life."
42 (Ariz. 1932) 8 Pac. (2d) 249; affirmed 11 Pac. (2d) 841.
'3 Accord. Myer v. Union L. H. & P. Co. (1912) 151 Ky. 332, 151 S. W. 941;
Cox v. Des Moines Co. (1930) 209 Ia. 931, 229 N. W. 244; N. Y., N. H. & H. R.
Co. v. Truckter (1922) 260 U. S. 141. But see apparently contra, Ark. P. &
L. Co. v. Kilpatrick (1932) 185 Ark. 678, 49 S. W. (2d) 353.
Stark v. Holtzelaw (1925) 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330.
5 Fiel v. City of Racine (1930) 203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611; Mindeman v.
Sanitary District (1925) 317 Ill. 529, 148 N. E. 304; Raeside v. Sioux City
(1930) 209 Iowa 975, 229 N. W. 216.
4Fiel v. City of Racine, note 45, above.
47 (1930) 209 Iowa 975, 229 N. W. 216.
"Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 224.
4 "(1930) 256 Ill. App. 439.
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Courts have hesitated to extend the doctrine to ordinary useful
articles and machinery.50 In Hernandez v. Santiago Orange
Growers Association51 a ten year old child had been killed when a
block of ice fell on him from a loading platform. The court re-
fused to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine with the statement
that it was never extended to ordinary loading operations. In Mc-
Donald v. Shreveport R. Co.52 electrical equipment operated in the
usual manner on private property was not considered an attrac-
tive nuisance. 53 The same rule has been stated as to elevators.5 4
May v. Summons,55 at first inspection is apparently contra, in that
an endless belt sawdust conveyer running between railroad cars
and a plant was held to be an inherently dangerous instrumental-
ity. However the real basis of this decision is that the doctrine
was held applicable because the defendant knew that small boys
often played and rode on the conveyer.
It is difficult to state the effect of the defendant's knowledge of
the trespass upon the application of the doctrine. Many courts
seem to stress the factor of actual knowledge.5 6 In one case,
strictly applying the doctrine in other regards, knowledge, actual
or implied, was considered immaterial.57 In Williams v. Bold-
ing 58 the court held that it was necessary to show actual knowl-
edge of at least some use by the injured party or others whenever
the "place or appliance cannot be said to possess a quality calcu-
lated to attract children generally."
One of the greatest restrictions upon the application of the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine has come through the repeated insist-
ence that the object or attractive thing be so situated as to induce
the trespass or be established near something else attractive
which induced the trespass. In Salt River Valley Water Users'
Association v. Compton,59 even though the transmission pole to
which were attached ladder steps was held to be an attractive
nuisance, recovery was denied since the injured child was induced
to trespass by a bird's nest on the pole and not by the pole itself.00
o United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt (1920) 258 U. S. 268.
51 (1930) 110 Cal. App. 229,293 Pac. 875.
52 (1932) 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252.
58 See collection of cases cited in the McDonald decision.
5& Crawford v. Rice (C. C. A. 1929) 36 Fed. (2d) 199; Haley Motor Co. v.
Boynton (1929) 40 Ga. App. 675, 150 S. W. 862.
55 (Fla. 1932) 140 So. 780.
51 May v. Summons, above, note 55; Hernandez v. Santiago Orange Grow-
ers' Ass'n, above, note 51; Miller v. Suburban Power Co. (1930) 410 Ohio 70,
179 N. E. 202; Adams v. Virginian Gasoline & Oil Co. (1930) 109 W. Va. 631,
156 S. W. 63.57 Morse v. Douglas, note 20, above.
58 (Ala. 1929) 124 So. 892.
59 Note 42, above.
60 Accord. Erie R. Co. v. Hilt (1917) 247 U. S. 97; Carr v. Oregon-Wash. R.
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Likewise liability has been denied where the child trespasses and
becomes injured by what ordinarily would be an attractive nui-
sance in order to win a bet or in answer to a dare.61 The general
rule is that if the child once becomes a trespasser he may not in-
voke the attractive nuisance doctrine if subsequently he discovers
the dangerous instrumentality, but several recent cases have dis-
regarded this principle.62
Liability in the view of some courts may hinge upon the ques-
tion of whether the attracting nature of the lure arose from a
static condition or from active operation of the owner, the owner
being held responsible in the latter situation.63 In Arrington
v. Town of Pinetops 6 a child was killed by contact with wires a
few feet above a pit containing machinery at work, and recovery
was allowed under the attractive nuisance doctrine. The court in
dicta seemed to approve the extension of liability even toward
adults.
A warning that will bring home to the child's mind and intelli-
gence that he has no right to interfere with the owner's property
right will negative any inference of an invitation,6 5 but it must be
more than merely advisory.6 6 If the warning is customarily dis-
regarded, the issue is more closely drawn, 67 but in any case, the
question of the sufficiency and effectiveness of the warning should
go to the jury.68
It has long been the tendency of many courts to restrict the doc-
trine to dangers which are latent.6 9 Attractiveness and danger-
Co. (1927) 123 Ore. 258, 261 Pac. 899. Contra, Zuidersick v. Minn. Utilities
Co. (1923) 155 Minn. 293, 193 N. W. 449.
61 Metijevich v. Dolese & Shepard Co. (1931) 261 Ill. App. 498; Burns v.
City of Chicago (1929) 338 Ill. 89, 169 N. E. 811; State ex rel. v. Trimble
(1926) 315 Mo. 32, 285 S. W. 455.
62 Gerneth v. Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. (Tex. Comm. App. 1931)
26 S. W. (2d) 191; Jones-Savage Lumber Co. v. Thompson (1930) 233 Ky.
198, 25 S. W. (2d) 373; K. C. ex. rel. Barlow v. Robinson (1929) 322 Mo. 1050,
17 S. W. (2d) 977; Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Powell (1931) 150 Okla. 39, 300
Pac. 788.
63 Ziehm v. Vale (1918) 98 Ohio St. 306, 120 N. E. 702; Hannan v. Erlick
(1921) 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N. E. 504; Gawronski v. McAdoo (1920) 226
Pa. 449, 109 Atl. 763.
64 (1929) 197 N. C. 433, 149 S. E. 549.
6s New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Truchter (1922) 260 U. S. 141; Baltimore
v. DePalma (1920) 137 Md. 179, 112 Atl. 277; Butz v. Cavanaugh (1897) 137
Mo. 503, 38 S. W. 1104; Davis v. Joslen Mfg. Co. (1900) 29 R. I. 101, 69 At.
65; Clark v. Northern P. R. Co. (1902) 29 Wash. 139, 69 Pac. 636.
Hicks v. Pacific R. Co. (1877) 64 Mo. 430.
67 Sandberg v. McGilvray-Richmond Granite Co. (1924) 66 Cal. App. 261,
226 Pac. 28; Kremposkey v. Mt. Jessup Coal Co. (1920) 266 Pa. 568, 109 Atl.
766; Burbridge v. Starr Mfg. Co., 54 U. S. 121.
*s Nashville Lumber Co. v. Bushee (1911) 100 Ark. 76, 139 S. W. 301.
69 Erickson v. Great Northern R. Co. (1900) 82 Minn. 60, 86 N. W. 462;
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ousness alone have not in some states been sufficient.70 The rea-
son for this limitation in those states adopting it may lie in the as-
serted derivation of the attractive nuisance doctrine from those
cases holding a landowner liable to a licensee for traps or con-
cealed defects. In Williams v. Bolding71 the rationalization was
made that since the doctrine was founded on the defendant's
superior knowledge of the peril, the danger must be latent in order
to authorize a recovery. It was said in Stimpson v. Bartax Pipe
Line Company72 that the attractive nuisance principle was appli-
cable only where there is a "concealed, hidden, or latent danger"
and did not apply where a child climbed trees attached to oil
tanks and then, in attempting to slide down a pipe, fell and was
injured.
In Ford v. Planters' Chemical & Oil Company73 a four year old
child was injured by a spiral conveyer of steel and iron on the out-
side of the defendant's building within fifteen feet of a public
highway and near a public playground. Recovery was refused on
the ground that the danger was obvious and patent and because
the plaintiff did not allege that children habitually resorted to the
defendant's property. Anticipating the natural inquiry as tojust what dangers are supposed to be obvious and patent to a four
year old child the court said: "Common experience shows that a
reasonable prudence may trust their avoidance to the universal
instinct of self-preservation. As for children so little advanced
as to be unable to recognize the most patent dangers, their inef-
ficiency cannot be allowed to shift the care for them from their
parents to strangers, or impose upon the owners of property the
duty and liability, where otherwise none would exist." It is sub-
nutted that the very occurrence of the injury shows that the "in-
stinct of self-preservation" is not strong enough, and that the
argument against shifting responsibility for very young children
from their parents to the owners of land might apply equally well
to latent perils as to those patent.
Where the child is of sufficient age and capacity to appreciate
the danger, the doctrine.of attractive nuisance does not apply,7 4
and this question ought certainly to be submitted to the jury.75
Smith v. 1. C. R. Co. (1916) 177 Ia. 243, 158 N. W. 546; Riggle v. Lens (1914)
71 Ore. 125, 142 Pac. 346; Southwest Cotton Co. v. Clements (1923) 25 Ariz.
124, 213 Pac. 1005.
70 Talardeau v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. (1931) 275 Mass. 196, 175
N. E. 471; Ark. Valley Trust Co. v. McIlroy (1911) 97 Ark. 160, 123 S. W.
816; Kramer v. So. R. Co. (1900) 127 N. C. 330, 37 S. W. 468.
71 (1929) 220 Ala. 328, 124 So. 892.
72 (1931) 120 Tex. 232, 36 S. W. (2d) 473.
78 (Ala. 1930) 126 So. 866.
74 Hanna v. Iowa C. R. Co. (1906) 129 I1. App. 134.
75 Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stine & Co. (1908) 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84; Taylor
v. Great Eastern Mining Co. (1920) 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss4/6
NOTES
As to the exact age limit for the application of the doctrine many
courts follow the old common law rules which are generally ap-
plicable to culpability for crimes and answerability for contribu-
tory negligence.7 6  In Columbus Mining Co. v. Napier's Adm'r 77
a fifteen year old boy, asphyxiated while playing in the drift
mouth of the defendant's tunnel, was held conclusively to be pre-
sumed to be outside the age limit within which children are pro-
tected under the attractive nuisances principle.7 8 However, it was
held in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hutton79 that a boy fourteen years
and seven months old was only prima facie outside the age limit.8o
The rule is stated that where a person arrives at an age which
renders him presumptively outside the class of youthful and indis-
creet persons "he is not entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of
attractive nuisances unless he shows that on account of his un-
developed mental condition he is entitled to be classed with those
for whose benefit the doctrine was created." In Empire Gas &
Fuel Co. 'v. Powell8 1 the plaintiff, a child under fourteen, entered a
closed building and was injured by dynamite caps which he found
there. The court held that a child under fourteen is presumed to
be capable of nothing more than a technical trespass.8 2 In such a
case the issue is generally left to the jury whether or not those
between seven and fourteen have reached such an age of discre-
tion as would remove them from the protection of the attractive
nuisance doctrine. Here, however, the plaintiff testified that he
knew that it was wrong to enter the building, knew that the caps
would explode, etc. He thus convicted himself of negligence and
knowledge; so that the court was authorized in directing a verdict
against him as a matter of law. It has been said that "an exami-
nation of most attractive nuisance cases will show that in nearly
every instance the child injured was less than ten years old."8&
This statement is certainly borne out by recent decisions.8 -
16 Barnhill v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co. (1910) 215 Fed. 608; Shaw v. Chicago
R. Co. (Mo. 1922) 184 S. W. 1151.
77 (1931) 239 Ky. 642, 40 S. W. (2d) 285.
78 Accord. C. of Ga. R. Co. v. Robins (1922) 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367. Mines
themselves have generally been held to be attractive nuisances as to the
"damps" or poisonous gases issuing therefrom. Drew v. Lett (Ind. 1932)
182 N. E. 547; Taylor v. Great Eastern Co. (1920) 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac.
101.
78 (1927) 220 Ky. 277,295 S. W. 175.
80 See cases cited and discussed in the Hutton case, above, note 79.
81 (1931) 150 Okla. 39, 300 Pac. 768.
82 City of Shawnee v. Cheek (1913) 41 Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724.
83 Belt R. Co. v. Charters (1905) 123 Ill. App. 322.
84 Corder v. Houston Light & Power Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 38 S. W.
(2d) 606; Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup (1929) 88 Ind. App.
572, 165 N. E. 246; Wright v. Powers & Sons (1931) 238 Ky. 572, 38 S. W.
(2d) 465; Huckleberry v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (1930) 324 Mo. 1025,25 S. W. (2d)
980.
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It has been held in one remarkable extension of the doctrine
that one who creates a condition dangerous to children is liable to
a third person who goes to the rescue of the children.85 A recent
Missouri case seems to ignore this view, however.8, No case is
immediately at hand as to the liability of one maintaining an at-
tractive nuisance for an injury to an innocent third party through
the agency of a child whose age is within the doctrine. In Lips-
comb v. Cincinnati N. & C. St. Ry. Co.87 the plaintiff was injured
by a boy who was swinging on a rope left dangling by the defend-
ant over a public sidewalk. There was an allegation of knowl-
edge in the plaintiff's petition. The lower court sustained a de-
murrer, but this holding was reversed on appeal with the holding
that knowledge of such a dangerous use established the plaintiff's
case, regardless of the boy's age.88 The court did not pass on a
case of the absence of such actual knowledge coupled with the fact
that the child was within the age limit of the doctrine.
There is a greater inclination to extend liability for dangerous
attractions in public highways than those on private premises.8 9
However by the weight of authority moving vehicles upon which
children attempt to catch rides are not attractive nuisances, and
there is no duty to guard against such trespasses. 90
Many states have declared themselves in line with the modern
tendency to limit the scope of application of the doctrine.91 It
has long been an established rule in Georgia that the principles of
the "turntable cases" will not be extended to cases which upon
their facts do not come "strictly and fully" within the principles
upon which those cases rest.92 The decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v.
BiittN8 is frequently cited to the effect that this doctrine which is
admittedly an exception to the established rules of law must be
cautiously applied.
86 Christiansen v. Los Angeles & St. L. R. Co., note 19, above.
86 Harakos v. Dickle, above, note 36.
87 (1931) 239 Ky. 587, 39 S. W. (2d) 991.
88 Cf. Harrington v. Border City Mfg. Co. (1925) 240 Mass. 170, 132 N. E.
721, defendant held liable where plaintiff was hit by a baseball batted from
defendant's land by boys whom the defendant knew were playing there.
89 Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886) 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155; Kressine v.
Jamesville Traction Co. (1921) 175 Wis. 192, 184 N. W. 771; Zuidersick v.
Minn. Utilities Co. (1923) 155 Minn. 293, 193 N. W. 449; Doyle v. Chatta-
nooga (1913) 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S. W. 997.
9D See cases cited at (1925) 36 A. L. R. 151 ff.
91United Zinc. & Chem. Co. v. Britt (1920) 258 U. S. 268; Bonhomie &
H. S. Ry. Co. v. Hinton, above, note 33; Carr v. Oregon-Wash. R. Co. (1927)
123 Ore. 259, 261 Pac. 899; Kelly v. Benos (1909) 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557;
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, above, note 42; Giannini v.
Compodonico (1917) 176 Cal. 548, 169 Pac. 80.
92 Haley Motor Co. v. Boynton, above, note 54.
93 (1920) 258 U. S. 268.
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It is to be regretted that this review of the recent decisions does
not show a greater consistency in the application of the law to the
group of specific fact situations which have arisen in connection
with this topic. The present uncertainty of judicial reasoning
has been and is a temptation to litigation. It is submitted that
this unhappy situation will not be remedied until the courts defi-
nitely adopt a single legal theory as explaining the attractive
nuisance doctrine and determine all future controversies by ref-
erence to this fundamental test.
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